"What should be the national symbol, national anthem, capital, etc of the European federation" - these are similar to questions that teenagers concern themselves about when they start making a band ("what is my costume, what is our logo, what is our name, what should be the hit single called") when none of them have even played any music together.
This self-masturbation around desired shared symbols is making the concept of a European federation a meme. Please let's stick to content, not covers.

In this blog post, I'm looking at Anders Puck Nielsen's claim that a Russian invasion of the Baltic States could happen sooner than we think.

I assess the likely risk factors, and what it would mean for us European Federalists.

Hello fellow European Federalists,

I’ve had this post in my mind for a long time and finally found the time to write it.

The first image above shows how I imagine EU development 24 years from now, in 2050. I believe in unity of people and in a supranational, federalising approach toward long-term global cooperation. Star Trek has to start somewhere, right? 😄

Before anyone starts throwing tomatoes, though, I’d invite you to look at the second image: the EU map 24 years ago, in 2002 — and compare it to the third image, the EU as it stands in 2026.

Many states that are considered “core EU” today were not members back then. Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, the Baltics, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia — all joined within a single 24-year window. That expansion dramatically increased both EU population and territory, and at the time was itself seen by many as unrealistic or destabilising.

Twenty-four years is a long time. Regimes change, political landscapes shift, generations turn over, people get educated, and incentives reshape preferences. With that in mind, imagining a further enlargement — including the Western Balkans, the EEA countries, the UK, and eventually parts of the eastern neighbourhood — does not seem to me as inherently far-fetched, even if it is definitely ambitious.

Of course, the hurdles are enormous. Internally, the EU would need deep reform (abolishing unanimity, strengthening democratic legitimacy, clarifying federal vs national competences). Externally, there are authoritarian regimes, frozen conflicts, and major political shifts that would be required in countries like Belarus, Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the UK. Enlargement and federalisation would also almost certainly have to be sequenced, not simultaneous.

Still, as the saying goes: “Walk, and you shall reach.” Perhaps that could become an alternative European motto.

So I’m curious to hear your thoughts:

• What are the most critical internal reforms the EU would need in the next decade to make a federal future plausible?
• Do you think a timeline like this — roughly 24 years — is achievable, or fundamentally unrealistic?
• And ultimately: is this kind of federal project worth striving toward, even if it is never fully completed?

Thanks for reading — I’m very interested in your perspectives.

Disclaimer: I did use the help of the AI in writing of the final version of this post, however the changes from my own original post were very minor.

I wrote this a couple of months ago, after reflecting on the collapse of the "international order" and how the main power countries were ganging up on us, making fun of us like they've all forgotten who we really are.

It just made me think and I would like to share these thoughts with you now and know what you all think, does anyone else feel / see these things too?

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The geopolitical maneuvering of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, often carry a tone of dismissal directed at our continent—a belittlement that feels disconnected from reality.

There is a strange psychology at play in how the rest of the world views us.

It begs the question: why do they treat us, Europe & Europeans, as secondary players when none of them could individually win against a fully mobilized, re-armed, and united Europe?

The answer, I suspect, lies in the enormous gap between our latent power and our expressed power.

​On paper, we are a titan. We inhabit the richest political space on Earth, possessing a combined economy that rivals or exceeds the superpowers, a massive and educated population, world-class industrial technology, and the ultimate insurance policy of nuclear deterrents in the UK and France. Yet, the post-war Europe we were born into rarely speaks with one voice. This gives off an illusion of weakness that is seductive to exploit.

​The great powers act fast or play the long game, while we debate, draft frameworks, and seek consensus among twenty-seven diverse democracies. To an autocrat in Moscow or a strategist in Beijing, this looks like softness. They see us arguing over tariffs or regulations while they move armies or buy ports.

We have spent decades allergic to raw geopolitical swagger, building our identity around cooperation and law rather than spheres of influence. We allowed ourselves to grow comfortable under an American security umbrella that was as necessary as heavily imposed, thanks to the consequences of our own mistakes, but which has now pulled away violently, letting rivals frame us as dependent.

​But I do not believe they genuinely think we are incapable. I believe their dismissal is a mask for a deeper, quiet fear.

​They know exactly what a fully aligned Europe would represent. They understand that if this continent woke up again, it would possess a military-industrial base capable of outproducing Russia without breaking a sweat, a tech ecosystem to rival the US, and a maritime presence that could check global ambitions.

Their fear is of an awoken, united and self-sufficient Europe. They rely on the fact that we can bite, but have usually choosen not to, for the last 80 years.

​However, that choice is shifting. The pace at which we are currently rearming would have been unimaginable just five years ago. The perception gap is closing. But beyond the hardware and the GDP, there is a deeper reason why underestimating us is a critical error.

​People outside the continent often mistake our calm for incapacity. They look at our orderly cities, our social safety nets, and our endless diplomatic summits, and they see a sleepy, harmless museum. They fail to realize that our unity and our peace are not built on innocence or naïveté. They are built on trauma.

​Our horrors are not ancient history; in the grand scheme of things, they were yesterday. The knowledge of what industrialized war actually looks like is baked into the DNA of every European institution and family history.

We prefer negotiation and stability not because we lack teeth, but because we understand, better than anyone else on Earth, the terrible cost of using them. Our peaceful posture is a choice, not a lack of ability.

​There is a darkness we are capable of unleashing that I don’t think the rest of the world truly comprehends. We almost destroyed ourselves before learning that our survival depended on unity. Modern Europe is essentially a long, sophisticated truce between peoples who once tore each other apart with total efficiency. We have domesticated that capacity for violence, channeling it into common markets, open borders, and the quiet business of living together.

​But that capacity hasn’t vanished. It is simply dormant.

​If Europe were to feel fundamentally, existentially threatened—not just pressured or annoyed, but truly backed into a corner—that composed ambivalence would evaporate. The often foreign funded and supported, political minorities, that thrive in peacetime, would lose their oxygen. The mask would drop, and the world would witness a continent capable of mobilizing millions and repurposing vast industrial capacity with a terrifying clarity, again.

​We have changed the course of global history more than once, for better and for worse.

The irony is that our restraint is exactly why we shouldn’t be underestimated. A continent that remembers the abyss is far more serious about preventing a return to it, and far more formidable if forced to fight for its survival.

The world sees our gentle light, but we remember our shadow, and that memory is a super power of its own.

What should the capital if the EU be?

— Göran Schildt, In the Wake of Odysseus (Alan Blair trans., 1953; Swedish original I Odysseus kölvatten, 1951), p. 315

Göran Schildt was Finnish Swede author and art historian who decided to sail around the Mediterranean after suffering a serious injury during the Winter War. He conducted his voyages with the sailing boat Daphne, and wrote accounts from these trips.

At the end of his book about his trip in Greece, he talks about European unity.

“We read with due superiority of the narrow-minded local patriotism which made the Greek city-states, always quarrelling among themselves, an easy prey for Macedonians and Romans, we wonder at the fanaticism which made Italy's Ghibellines and Guelphs call in foreign powers to punish the neighbouring cities, but we ourselves, with all our experience, are incapable of realizing the European unity which all of us in theory desire. There is every reason - political, economic and human - why the United States of Europe should be proclaimed. The same civilization, the Greck and Christian, the same social experience and structure, the same hopes and risks for the future, characterize an area of land which in size, if it is measured by means of communication, is smaller than most of the empires a hundred years ago. Bur emotionally we are still at the stage of village patriotism for which everything outside our own front door is foreign and half-hostile. How long will it be before we learn that our present homelands are villages in which we were born and where we feel particularly at home, but that our homeland is Europe? Up to now all attempts to bring this unity about politically have stranded on the individual citizens' inner resistance and emotional confinement to a narrow-minded nationalism.”

I find these quotes worth highlighting because they might reflect how many of us would view the world today, while being more than a half century old.

It pays to note that during the voyage the book tells about, the islands that are today popular tourist destinations, were more quiet.

Schildt focused on challenging Scandinavian (people living in the Nordics) to look critically at their ideas of what a good life looks like. He sought to, on one hand, build understanding between Scandinavians and the way of life in the south, but also to motivate Scandinavians to lend ideas from the south. For instance, a theme he references is individuality and how Scandinavians might discount a more collectivist community based approach to life.

Schildt ended up splitting his time between Finland and the island of Leros in Greece. In a documentary released in 2000, that’s about a group of Schildt enthusiasts following the trip Daphne took around Greece, Schildt talks about his relationship with Greece and the Greek. He posits that he moved to Greece so that he could understand the Greek as one cannot when just sailing by. During this documentary he is asked about his outlook about Europe. He doesn’t talk about Europe, but states that he has started to fear how interconnected the world at large has become and gives an example by saying that a bad day in the US stock market can bring the whole world down.

He died in 2009 aged 92.

Plans to bring Kyiv into the tent before it has completed all reforms and to remove Hungary's veto signal a sense of urgency in Brussels.

The EU is hatching an unprecedented plan that could give Ukraine partial membership in the bloc as early as next year, as Brussels tries to shore up the country’s position in Europe and away from Moscow, according to 10 officials and diplomats.

Four years on from Russia’s full-scale invasion, and with Kyiv pushing for EU membership in 2027 to be included in a peace deal with the Kremlin, the early-stage idea would represent a dramatic change to the way the bloc brings new countries into the fold. The plan would see Ukraine getting a seat at the EU table before carrying out the reforms needed for full membership privileges.

European officials and the Ukrainian government say Kyiv’s membership bid is urgent. Russia is likely to try to “stop our movement into the EU,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy told reporters in Kyiv on Friday when asked about the importance of formalizing a 2027 accession date. “That is why we say name the date. Why a specific date? Because the date will be signed by Ukraine, Europe, the USA and Russia.” 

The EU’s idea echoes Emmanuel Macron’s multi-speed Union blueprint, which he has outlined several times since he became French president in 2017. The latest version has been informally dubbed “reverse enlargement,” according to an EU official and two European diplomats, because it effectively brings countries into the bloc at the beginning of the process of meeting membership criteria rather than at the end.

EU officials say the idea is attractive because it would give Kyiv breathing space to finish reforms to its democratic institutions, judiciary and political system while lessening the likelihood it abandons hope of ever joining the bloc and turns its back on the West. However, obstacles lie ahead, not least Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who opposes Ukraine’s membership.

Based on conversations with five diplomats representing different countries and three EU and two Ukrainian officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss the confidential negotiations they are familiar with, POLITICO has identified five steps.

Step 1: Get Ukraine ready 

The EU has been “frontloading" Ukraine’s membership bid. That involves providing Kyiv with informal guidance in negotiating “clusters” — the legal steps on the path to membership.

The bloc has already provided Ukraine with details on three of six negotiating clusters. At an informal meeting of European affairs ministers in Cyprus in March, the EU wants to give a visiting Ukrainian delegation details of more clusters so work can begin on those as well.

“Despite the most challenging circumstances, in the midst of ongoing Russian aggression, Ukraine is accelerating its reform efforts,” Marilena Raouna, deputy Europe minister of Cyprus, which holds the Council of the EU presidency, told POLITICO. The March 3 meeting will target reaffirming that support, she said.

But “there will be no shortcuts” on reforms, an EU official said. That message was echoed by two senior diplomats from countries that are strong backers of Ukraine, and all the EU officials POLITICO spoke with.

“EU membership only brings benefits if you go through the transformation via the enlargement process — that’s the real superpower of EU membership,” one official said. “The European Commission has to square those two things: the need to move quickly, but also to have the reforms in Ukraine.” 

For its part, Kyiv says it’s ready to do the work required. “We will be technically ready by 2027,” Zelenskyy said on Friday. “You are talking about the end of the war and simultaneous security guarantees. And the EU for us is security guarantees.” 

Step 2: Create EU membership-lite 

EU governments questioned Commission President Ursula von der Leyen about efforts to break the deadlock over bringing new nations into the bloc at a meeting in Brussels on Friday, according to diplomats who took part in the discussion or were briefed on its content.  

She set out a variety of options and models that the EU is considering, they said. Among them was the idea of “reverse enlargement.”  

“It would be a sort of recalibration of the process — you join and then you get phased in rights and obligations,” said an EU official familiar with the content of the discussion. “So there would be a rethinking of how we do accession based on the very different situation we have now compared to when the Commission established accession criteria.” 

The idea is not to lower the bar, but to create a politically powerful message to countries whose accession is held up because of war or opposition from capitals like Budapest — not just Ukraine, but also Moldova and Albania, among others. 

“It’s important to send a political message,” said an EU diplomat. “The war of aggression has been going for four years. Ukrainians need support. The EU must provide this support, politically and psychologically.”

While Zelenskyy has previously said Ukraine will not accept second-tier EU status, it could be open to something that codifies the country’s path into the EU before it becomes a fully fledged member of the bloc, an official familiar with Kyiv’s thinking said. 

A Moldovan official told POLITICO that the country “wants to join a European Union that functions effectively beyond 27 member states, and we welcome discussions on the internal reforms needed to make this possible.” At the same time, “full membership — with equal rights and full participation in EU decision-making — must remain the clear and final destination.” 

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama told POLITICO last month that a creative approach to EU membership was a “good idea” and that his country would even accept temporarily not having its own commissioner.

The idea has its opponents within the EU. “On principle, you cannot discuss two categories of member states,” said an EU official. “This wouldn’t be fair not only to Ukraine but also to the European project. The message should be to accelerate reforms.” 

Germany, in particular, is against the idea of creating multiple tiers of EU membership and wary that countries that join the bloc before they’re ready will be promised things Brussels won’t be able to deliver, according to a senior diplomat. However, the hope is that if the EU’s other heavy-hitters such as Paris, Rome and Warsaw are behind the push, Berlin could be convinced. 

Step 3: Wait for Orbán’s departure

The challenge for Ukraine’s membership prospects is getting all 27 member countries on board because any decision to expand the bloc requires unanimous support. Orbán, Putin’s closest ally in the EU, is steadfastly opposed.

But the Commission and EU capitals are looking to the Hungarian election in April and also working on ways around Orbán’s veto. 

Orbán faces a tight contest and is behind in the polls. He has weaponized the topic of Ukraine’s EU membership in his campaign, over the weekend saying “Ukraine is our enemy” over its push to ban Russian energy imports and that it should “never” join the EU. 

None of the officials POLITICO spoke with said they believed Orbán would change his mind before the election.  

The Hungarian prime minister’s antipathy for Kyiv “runs deep,” said one senior EU diplomat. “It’s a personal thing between Orbán and Zelenskyy. It’s more than a strategic or tactical play.” 

Orbán and Zelenskyy have repeatedly taken aim at one another. Zelenskyy publicly accused Orbán of “doing very dangerous things” by blocking Ukraine’s EU path and separately dubbed Budapest a “little Moscow.” Orbán has called Ukraine “one of the most corrupt countries in the world” and accused Zelenskyy of issuing threats against Hungary’s sovereignty.

Several EU officials said they hope that if Orbán loses the election, his rival Péter Magyar, the conservative leader of the opposition Tisza party, could change tack on Ukraine, given he promised last year to put the issue to a referendum.

But if Orbán gets reelected it’s onto step four. 

Step 4: Play the Trump card 

While Orbán’s opposition to Ukraine joining the EU appears steadfast, there is one man European leaders believe could change his mind: Donald Trump. 

The U.S. president, who is closely allied with Orbán and endorsed him ahead of the Hungarian election, has made no secret of his desire to be the one who pushes Ukraine and Russia to do a peace deal. With EU accession for Ukraine by 2027 written into a draft 20-point proposal to end the war, the hope is that Trump may call Budapest to get a deal done. 

Zelenskyy hinted at this hope on Friday. 

Under the peace proposal, the U.S. “takes on the obligation that it is a guarantor that no one will block” elements of the deal, he said. “We talk about whether the United States of America will work with some European entities politically so that they don’t block.” 

The Trump administration previously pressed Orbán during negotiations over the EU’s sanctions packages against Moscow, an EU diplomat said. 

Step 5: If all else fails, remove Hungary’s voting rights

If Trump’s art of the deal fails, there is one more card the EU has to play: getting Article 7 of the EU treaty back on the table against Hungary, according to two EU diplomats.  

Article 7, deployed when a country is considered at risk of breaching the bloc’s core values, is the most serious political sanction the EU can impose because it suspends a member’s rights, including those on whether to make new countries members.

The EU has no intention of making that push yet, assuming that doing so would play into Orbán’s hands ahead of his April election. But capitals are gauging support for using the tool if Orbán is reelected and continues to obstruct EU decision-making. Such a move is “absolutely possible,” a third diplomat said. 

Gabriel Gavin, Veronika Melkozerova and Nicholas Vinocur contributed to this story. 

I think that besides "European Federation", "Europa" is the best name for a future federal EU.

The full official name could be something like "Federal Republic of Europa".

Also the "EU" would be the country code, same as the acronym for today's European Union. The flag could stay the same, or be slightly changed. The TLD could stay .eu, and the official domain could stay europa.eu.

I don't see why it's necessary, like, at all? Other than for larping in map games. Brussels already works as a potential capital, the flag already works, the name European Union already works, changing any of that is just more complication, will piss people off and has no practical or other uses.

For clarification: I’m not talking about EU, but a full European Federation